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JUSTICE COURT REFORM IN MONTANA*
Lon T. Holden
INTRODUCTION
An integral part of any state judicial reform that has occurred
in recent years has been either the abolition or complete overhaul of
justice of the peace court system.1 Such action has been the result of
a continuing barrage of literature which has attacked this court system
on all fronts2 and left future commentators only to add insult to
injury. Formal criticisms of justices and their operations have been
raised in Montana as well.3 Numerous attempts at responding to this
and other criticism have been made in proposed constitutional amend-
ments and legislation, 4 but the system has continued to the present in
substantially the same form as has existed since statehood.
However, the passage of Montana's new constitution5 and its ulti-
mate validation by the Montana supreme court6 make change in this
particular level of the court system inevitable. It is here provided that:
*Many of the observations in this comment are made as a result of a survey conducted
by the author of the justice of the peace court system in Montana, June-August, 1972.
This survey was conducted under a grant from the Governor's Crime Control Commis-sion, and focused primarily upon field visits with justices and questionnaires sent to
county attorneys. Both the interviews and the questionnaires utilized open-end questions,
the initial assumption being that the system was in need of change, and the primary
concern being the form this change should take. Personal interviews were conducted
with sixty of the 170 justices serving in the state. Most of these interviews took place
in the locality served by the justices, with the remainder being held at either training
sessions or the annual convention of the Montana Magistrates Association, September
14-16, 1972. Questionnaires were sent to and received from justices in counties that
were not visited, so that at least one justice in fifty-one of the fifty-six counties was
either interviewed or contacted by questionnaire. Responses to similar questionnaires
were received from thirty-eight county attorneys. The opinions expressed in this com-
ment are the author's and not those of the Governor's Crime Control Commission or
the Montana Magistrates Association.
1Within the past twenty-five years, two-thirds of the states have undertaken reorgani-
zation of their lower court systems. For detailed information on these individual re-
organization, see THE INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, THE JUSTICE OF THE
PEACE TODAY (1965) [hereinafter cited as IJA, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE TODAY];
THE AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, A SELECTED CHRONOLOGY AND BIBLIOGRAPHY Or
COURT ORGANIZATION REFORM, REPORT No. 12, (1970) [hereinafter cited as AJS, A
SELECTED CHRONOLOGY AND BIBLIOGRAPHY OF COURT ORGANIZATION REFORM]; BOOZ,
ALLEN AND HAMILTON, INC., APPENDIX TO THE CALIFORNIA LOWER COURT STUDY, Ap-
pendix F (1971). The federal judiciary has had its commissioner system reformed by
enactment of the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-9 (Supp. V, 1970).
'Due to the many and varied writings that are critical of the system, mention of even
a representative listing would be impractical. A bibliography of interest can be found
in IJA, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE TODAY, supra note 1 at 118-31.
8Mason and Crowley, Montana's Judicial System--A Blueprint for Modernization, 29
MONT. L. Rsv. 1 (1967). [hereinafter cited as Mason and Crowley].
'S. MUCKELSTON, THE JUDICIARY, MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION STUDY, No.
14, 91 (1971-1972) [hereinafter cited as MUCKELSTON].
5For the sake of simplicity, the following textual material will speak of the Montana
constitution of 1889 as "old" and of the constitution approved by the vote of the
people of this state on June 6, 1972 as "new."
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(1) There shall be elected in each county at least one justice of
the peace with qualifications, training, and monthly compensation
provided by law. There shall be provided such facilities that they
may perform their duties in dignified surroundings.(3) The legislature may provide for additional justices of the
peace in each county."
This section reaffirms the constitutional status of justice courts as ex-
pressed in section 1,8 and thus reflects the Constitutional Convention's
acceptance of a retained, reformed justice court system and its re-
jection of any proposal which would have abolished the system al-
together. The delegates to the Convention were presented with several
reform alternatives in this area,9 with the retention of justice courts
as constitutional courts being at the shallow end of the reformistic
continum. One proposal in particular would have followed a prevailing
trend and adopted a unified court system where the jurisdiction now
exercised by justice courts would have been absorbed by the district
courts.'0 This would have left the state with only one level of trial
courts and thus, along with the supreme court, a two-court system.
Under such a plan, the workload currently handled by justices would
have been turned over to magistrates, appointed by the district judges,"
and required to have been admitted to the practice of law unless a
person with such a qualification was not available.' 2
No attempt will be made here to laud or condemn the proposal
ultimately adopted by the Constitutional Convention, but the proposal's
acceptance at the exclusion of others does indicate that the basic mold
in which lower court reform in this state can take has already been
cast. Certain reform alternatives that have been adopted in other
states and debated in this state have already been rejected. Thus, any
immediate discussion of justice court reorganization in Montana must
begin with the basic hypothesis that these courts are to be retained, and
improvement will come about by an overhaul rather than an abolition of
the system. This hypothesis will remain valid unless and until the
judicial article is amended.
This comment will consider some of the more glaring deficiencies
that have continued to exist in justice courts in this state, and also
raise some of the alternatives that implementation of the justice of the
'State of Montana ex rel. Cashmore v. Anderson, ...... Mont ....... 500 P.2d 921 (1972).
MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 5 (1972).
WMONT. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1972).
9MUCKELSTON, aupra note 4 at 86-7.
raTHE MONTANA CITIZENS CO1FERENCE -FO COURT IMPROVEMENT, A MONTANA PLAN
FOa COURT IMPROVEMENT. For a more general discussion of unified court systems and
'their implementation, see ADVISORY -COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMEIENTAL RELATIONS,
STATE-LocAL RELATIONS IN THE -CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 184-91 (Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971). [hereinafter cited as ACIR, STATE-LOcAL
RELATIONS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM].
uTiEs MONTANA CITIZENS CONFERENCE FOR COURT IMPROVEMENT, A MONTANA PLAN
FOR COURT IMPROVEMENT, supra note 10 at Section 9.
"Id. at Section 12.
1973]
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peace section of the new judiciary article could take. It is recognized
at the outset that any such reform must be treated as the proverbial
seamless web, and that any tinkering with the system in one area neces-
sitates corresponding action in other areas. Therefore, even though
the following discussion is divided into the numerous problems that
any reform effort need consider, it must be kept in mind that attempted
solutions of these problems must be viewed in context. It is only in
this way that successful reform of the justice courts as a true system
can be achieved.
NUMBER AND PLACEMENT OF JUSTICES
Under the old constitution and by present statute, there are to
be two justices of the peace for each township in Montana.' 3 This
requirement is unrealistic even to the casual observer of the justice
court system, and its failure is attested to by the fact that there are
two justices per township in only the larger counties. The distribution
of those justices that do serve bears little if any relationship either to
the geographic size of the county or its population. 14 Because of the
large numbers of justices, there often are not sufficient county resources
to allow each justice to maintain an adequate court operation. Further-
more, it is often the case that where there are two or more justices in
an area, one of them will handle the majority of the caseload and the
other justice or justices will handle the remainder in some form of a
back-up capacity. 5
Such a situation of an overabundance and poor placement of jus-
tices has long been recognized as one of the major faults of this court
system, and was recently treated as such in a report by the Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.' 6 The drafters of the new
.Montana constitution implicitly recognized this problem as well by
concluding that there shall be at least one justice of the peace in each
county, and that the legislature could provide for additional justices
in a county if necessary.' 7 Such a mandate does not, of course, further
the often cited goals of complete trial court consolidation and unifi-
cation of all court levels in the judicial system, but it does raise num-
erous possibilities for reorganization of the present justice court structure.
At least one state has faced the facts of the constitutional status of
justice courts and their poor condition by simply deemphasizing them,
and relying on other lower court systems to handle what had been at
ISMONT. CONST. art. VIII, § 20 (1889); REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, § 93-401 (1947)
[hereinafter cited at R.C.M. 1947]. See also R.C.M. 1947, § 16-2404, where "two
justices of the peace" are considered officers of townships.
'"Mason and Crowley, supra note 3 at 7; MUCKELSTON, supra note 4 at 79.15interviews with justices, June-August, 1972.
'
0 ACIR, STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS IN THE CRiMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 10 at
36.
'
7MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 5 (1972).
sSee, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 61-1603 (1964). Civil jurisdiction is given to magistrate and
[Vol. 34
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one time within justice court jurisdiction.' Applying such an alter-
native in Montana in hopes of removing the justice courts from active
operation does not appear either feasible or very wise. There are
presently no other lower court systems operating in the state that
could absorb the justice court workload.19 There would therefore have
to be another court system created for this purpose. This would only
increase the jurisdictional confusion and the qualifications, financial
and supervisory problems that already plague the lower court system
in Montana. Proliferation of court systems is not a goal of judicial
reform, and would create more problems in this state than it would
solve.
Assuming for a moment that both reducing the numbers of justices
and consolidation of lower courts are desirable, a second alternative
would be to consolidate the jurisdictions of justice and police courts
into one county court.20 There would thus be only one lower court in a
county, situated in the county seat and staffed by one or more justices
depending on the county's population. Such an arrangement might not
be totally beneficial or politically acceptable in the largest counties
because of present satisfaction with the separate operations of their
police and justice courts. For this and other reasons, larger counties
could if necessary be exempted from any city-county judicial consoli-
dation.
This consolidation would, however, have numerous advantages in
the smaller counties. Two separate judicial operations would no longer
have to be maintained, and as a result, solutions to the problems facing
the lower courts would be more attainable. With the combination of
city-county funding, more money would be available to pay one judge
an adequate salary, provide him with acceptable facilities in which
to hold court, and allow him to receive the training necessary to function
in a competent manner. With the caseloads of these two courts joined,
it would be possible to utilize more lower court judges on a full-time
basis. This would not only allow those judges that do serve a chance
to develop a greater expertise in the matters that come before them,
county courts, while " . . . justices of the peace shall have no jurisdiction in any
case, civil or criminal, except in civil actions for the recovery of money only where the
amount claimed, exclusive of costs, does not exceed the sum of one dollar ($1).''
"Even though R.C.M. 1947, § 11-1701 provides for the creation of municipal courts in
cities with populations of more than 20,000 persons, no such courts are now in opera-
tion. Police courts, established under R.C.M. 1947, § 11-1601, are in most cases no
more desirable than justice courts because of comparable personnel and operational
problems.
"Police courts do not have constitutional status under either the 1889 or 1972 consti-
tutions. Their creation by legislative was pursuant to section 24 of the old constitu-
tion which stated that "The legislative assembly shall have power to provide for
creating police and municipal courts and magistrates for cities and towns as may be
deemed necessary from time to time . . . .' This or similar language does not appear
in the new constitution, although section 1 provides:" ''The judicial power of the state
is vested in . . . such other courts as may be provided by law."
1973]
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but would also remove the dangers of conflicts of interest that arise
when a judge must seek outside employment to make a living.2
Even if this consolidation is not feasible at this time, it would still
be desirable to reduce the numbers of justices by structuring them in a
county court system. This arrangement would seem to reflect the intent
of the new constitution's provisions concerning justices, and would still
accomplish many of the benefits that would accrue from city-county
judicial consolidation. The structure would involve the creation of a
justice court in each county seat, and since there may be more than
one justice of the peace in each county,22 the court could be staffed by
one or more justices. Legislation could require that a county falling
within a certain population classification must elect so many justices
to serve in the county seat, and that these justices must serve on a
full or part-time basis depending on the county's population. 23 Special
consideration would have to be given to those counties where the popu-
lation dictates that there should be only one justice serving in the
county seat, but where travel distances or other genuine reasons would
call for more than just this one location. The legislature could make
individual determinations in the cases of those counties claiming that
the county seat is not readily accessible to other parts of the county,
and then provide for the election of any additional justices needed.
Such a decision-making power could also be delegated to the supreme
court, 24 or to the counties themselves to decide where placement of the
justices should be made.2 5 Regardless of what means is utilized to deter-
mine this placement, great care must be taken in not resurrecting the
present problem of too many justices.
A third alternative would be for legislation to allow counties to
band together in multi-county justice court districts, and have one or
more justices exercise jurisdiction throughout the district. This would
allow several rural counties, each of which perhaps cannot adequately
support an effective justice court operation, to pool their resources and
have one qualified, full-time justice who could travel throughout the
area on a circuit rider basis. Pressing criminal matters that came up in
fACIR, STATE-LOcAL RELATI01S IN THE CRIMINAL JuSTIcE SYsTEM, supra note 10 at
44.
IZMONT. CONST. art. VII, § 5 (1972).
"Through observation of numerous justice courts in operation, it is roughly estimated
by the author that counties with a population of 40,000 persons or more need at least
two full-time justices; counties with populations of 15,000-40,000 persons, one full-
time justice; counties with populations of 5,000-15,000 persons, one justice on a half-
day basis; and counties with populations of fewer than 5,000 persons, one justice sit-
ting only one or more hours a day. These general estimates are of course only that,
and do not take into consideration individual county circumstances, possible changes
in the jurisdiction of justice courts, or additional clerical aid for justices.
2'Researeh for the decisions by the supreme court could be made by administrative
personnel. Infra at 141-2.
2For example, if the population of a county called for one full-time justice, the board
of county commissioners could be empowered to split this position, and have one justice
elected to serve on a part-time basis in the county seat and one part-time in some other
area of the county.
[Vol. 34
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his absence could be handled by a justice elected in each county, serving
on an as-needed basis, and paid an hourly wage. A question with this
arrangement would arise since the new constitution does not include the
position of justice of the peace as one that two or more counties can
consolidate,26 but if each county retained one justice, no consolidation
would seemingly be effected.
Apart from a plan calling for a justice to be elected in each town
having a minimal population, 27 any alternative that is considered must
focus on reducing the current number of justice of the peace positions.
No matter how this reduction in numbers is accomplished, the complaint
is sure to be heard that some areas of a county will no longer have a
justice of the peace readily available. The argument will be made that
if a county only has a justice court in the county seat, a citizen living
in a rural area will be greatly inconvenienced in taking care of a traffic
or fish and game violation. The question also arises of how a law en-
forcement officer in a rural area is to obtain a warrant or bring an
arrested person before a magistrate when a justice is not readily avail-
able. These and other problems of accessibility must be given serious
thought, but they are not insurmountable.
As discussed above, provision could be made to allow either the
legislature or some other body to consider the individual needs of counties
and grant necessary exceptions to any limitations on the number of
justices that are imposed. Should such a request fail, it might be neces-
sary for a county to put its justice or justices on a circuit rider basis
with trips made regularly to other populated areas of the county.28 If
police judges are retained, these judges could be utilized in the absence
of the justice to accept fines and take care of the other administrative
matters that consume so much of a justice's time. The police judge
could also be empowered to serve as a committing magistrate.
There are means, therefore, by which a smaller community could
get by without its own justice, and consequently allow a reduction in
the number of justices. Thus, just because an area will lose a justice
that has had one in the past does not mean that either an ordinary
citizen or a law enforcement officer need suffer by that loss. It is to
be hoped that while their access to a local justice will be decreased,
they will have greater access to a competent justice.
2MONT. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (1972).
71Such a plan would be favored by many justices of the peace, and in fact was supported
by the majority of justices attending the Justice of the Peace and City Court Judges
School, July 24-27, 1972, in Bozeman, Montana.
2A circuit rider arrangement was suggested by several of those justices and county
attorneys interviewed, June-August, 1972.
1973]
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The legislature is mandated by the new constitution to establish
qualifications for the office of justice of the peace,29 the lack of which
has always been one of the primary criticisms of this lower court sys-
tem. The legislative responsibility is not a new one, however, and has
already been exercised.3 0 The only real qualification in Montana to
satisfy in becoming a justice has been and continues to be one's ability
to get more votes in an election than his opponent, and while electoral
acceptability is important, political and judicial ability are not synony-
mous. Any court system is only as effective as its personnel, and thus
no reform of the justice courts will be successful unless only qualified
persons are attracted to and allowed to remain on the bench. To
accomplish this goal, qualifications should be imposed on candidates
for this office that recognize both the indivdual characteristics of this
state and the desperate need to improve the quality of justice dispensed
at that level of our judicial system. Such qualifications can be divided
into several categories, each of which can be discussed separately.
CITIZENSHnP
The requirement of United States or state citizenship is made in a
limited number of jurisdictions,8 ' and its existence, if not of great con-
sequence, is at least harmless. Under the new Montana constitution,
United States citizenship is required of a state supreme court justice
or district court judge.32 Requiring similar citizenship of justices of
the peace would not work great improvement in the system, but it would
be a step towards uniform judicial qualifications.
STATE RESIDENCY
The requirement of residence in a state for a certain time before
the election has also been made.3 3 Any such qualification can be viewed
in much the same light as citizenship, and again, to promote similar treat-
ment of all judges in the state, justices could be required to reside in the
state for two years before taking office. 3 4 Considering the local character
of the justice of the peace position, a similar requirement could be made
as to residency in the county where election is sought. One factor to
be kept in mind, however, is that both citizenship and residency require-
ments have a questionable correlation to a person's knowledge of the
law and his overall competency as a judge. There is the argument that
a judge with long tenure in an area can better understand the people
'MONT. Co NST. art. VII, § 5 (1972).
8OUnder R.C.M. 1947, § 93-704, the only qualifications presently existing to seek the
office of justice of the peace are to be a citizen of the United States and be a resident
of the county for one year before election. To retain the office, a justice must reside
in the township where he serves.UIJA, THE JusTICE OF THE PEACE TODAY, supra note 1 at table following 16.
82MONT. CONST. art VII, § 9 (1972).
8Supra, note 31.
"
4MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 9 (1972).
[Vol. 34
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and their legal problems that come before him,3 5 but it is this very
situation that will allow a lower court judge to let his personal pre-
ferences and prejudices prevail over the impartial application of the
law to fact.36
MORAL CHARACTER
A justice of the peace should of course be of good moral character,
and at least one state has imposed such a requirement.3 7 Again, such
a qualification is not harmful, but it in practice does little to weed out
those who are actually morally or otherwise unqualified for the position.
The effect of such a requirement will hopefully be achieved by a vigilant
judicial standards commission,3" and the requirement would be super-
fluous.3 9
AGE
Sure to be a controversial topic is whether it is necessary to impose
either a minimum age requirement for running for the office of justice
of the peace, or a mandatory retirement age for those who are holding
the position. There are no such age limitations set under the old or
the new constitutions or by statute in Montana, but it is a qualification
that must be considered.
As for a minimum age, there are states requiring candidates to be
of a certain age before holding the office.40 Many Montana justices,
as well as a few county attorneys, agree with such a qualification and
would require candidates to be at least twenty-one, or in some cases,
twenty-five. It is true that aging does bring to most persons a greater
understanding of human nature, but this process does not necessarily
bring either the desire or the ability to study the law and decide cases
impartially. Thus, imposing such a limitation would seem to be of
undeterminable value and is not recommended by knowledgeable com-
mentators. If an upgrading of the system does make the position of
justice of the peace more desirable,42 the hazards of the ballot box
will take their toll of many of the younger, less-known candidates.
Any discussion of a mandatory retirement age for any occupation
is sure to give off more heat than light on the subject, but it is a pos-
sible qualification that must be debated. The Advisory Commission on
8This argument was made by several of the justices interviewed, June-August, 1972.
SACIR, STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 10 at
203.
17LA. CONST. art. 7, § 47 (1921).
'SMONT. CONST. art. VII, § 11 (1972). For a brief discussion of this Commission, see
infra at 147-8.
'Should a written listing of ethical standards be felt necessary, a code of ethics forjustices in particular could be drafted and observed. Infra at 148.
40KENT. CONST. § 100 (1891), (twenty-four; TENN. CODE ANN. § 19-104 (1955) (twenty-
one).
"Interviews with justices and questionnaires from county attorneys, June-August, 1972.
'rhe key to this desirability will be an acceptable salary; see infra at 135-7.
19731
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Intergovernmental Relations considered both sides of this argument and
recommends that ". . . where lacking, State laws require mandatory
retirement of State and local judges upon reaching age seventy. '43 At
least twenty-three states cope with the problem of aged justices by
imposing such a retirement requirement, usually at the age of seventy.
44
As contended above, age bears no direct relation to a justice's
abilities to discharge his responsibilities, and in most cases, mandatory
retirement would only cause the loss of qualified manpower. However,
it is those justices who simply do not know when to quit that make
some sort of control necessary, and it is these few who spoil it for the
majority. A mandatory retirement age would mean that a justice who
is losing his capabilities will not be able to hold the position solely
as a means of supplementing his retirement income as is often the case.
It can be argued that no such age should be set by legislation, but
rather, the judicial standards commission should handle this problem
on an individual basis.45 This action would allow older justices who are
still competent to remain on the bench, and would be using this com-
mission as it was intended. The opposing argument is that these com-
missions are often not as effective as they should be, and that any
time a subjective judgment is exercised as to a person's capabilities,
mistakes are going to be made. Furthermore, a more humane approach
when removing an aged justice from office would seem to exist when
he knows he must step down at a certain time, and not let him remain
in doubt as to his tenure until an arbitrary determination of his judicial
abilities is made.46
EDUCATION
Nothing is more controversial and at the center of any justice court
reform than the subject of educational qualifications. The layman justice
of the peace, lacking a legal education of any sort, has been continually
exposed as a judicial impostor. His failure to know both the law and
how to apply it in a particular case goes to the core of any attacks on
this court system and must provide a focal point for any reform efforts.
Along with many, if not most other commentators, the Advisory Com-
mission on Governmental Relations concludes that ". . . a judge can not
be competent unless he is licensed to practice law," and recommends
that all judges in a state be so licensed.47 Such a position reflects the
school of thought that considers legal training to be the base upon
which sound legal judgments are built, and which contends that the
dACIR, STATFE-LOCAL RELATIONS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 10 at
43.
"Id. at 206.
"See discussion of the Commission infra at 147-8. Data was not compiled on the indi-
vidual ages of the justices interviewed, but a fair estimate would be that thirty-six
of the sixty were of retirement age.
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public image of justice courts can only be improved if and when lawyers
sit as justices of the peace as they do at all other levels of the court
system.48
The opposing theory is that the application of common sense to
legal questions should be at the heart of the justice court system, and
that the acquisition of such an attribute does not depend upon a law
degree. This theory is obviously popular with justices out of a sense of
self-preservation, 49 and does have its outside supporters.50 The theory is
defended by its supporters on the grounds that it is refreshing to have a
court level in a judicial system that does not adhere to often senseless
procedures and hidebound, hair-splitting precedents.
This "common sense" position is only acceptable, however, when
a justice has a satisfactory knowledge of the law, especially of civil and
criminal procedure. He then can temper the harshness of the law with
equity and common sense in the truest sense of justice. Many justices
in Montana simply do not posses this basic legal knowledge, however,
and must substitute common sense for the law in reaching many de-
cisions. The issue thus should not be cast in terms of an either-or propo-
sition, but rather one of priorities.
In light of the wording of the new constitution, there is no tech-
nical reason why a law degree requirement for all justices could not
still be imposed. But even if this were agreed to be desirable, the fre-
quently mentioned practical and political hurdles would have to be
cleared. It is no secret that practicing attorneys are rare in the rural
areas of the state,51 and that even if a circuit rider arrangement were
practical in these areas, the travel and relatively low salary would hard-
ly attract competent attorneys in great numbers. The political facts of
life require that the failure of the Constitutional Convention to adopt
the Montana Plan be kept in mind, as well as the feeling, still deep-
rooted in many Montana communities, that a justice of the peace should
be a local justice administering local justice. 52
One reasonable compromise for this disagreement in both theory
and practice would be to require a justice to be an attorney, but only
"This thinking was implicit in A MONTANA PLAN FOR COURT IMPROVEMENT, 8upra note
10 at Section 12.
"Eight of the justices interviewed, June-August, 1972, considered "good common horse
sense" to be the only qualification necessary to hold the position.
5JUDGE E. GADImER BROWNLEE, THE MONTANA JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND POLICE
JuDoE. (1970), 103 [hereinafter cited as BROWNLEE].
aPetroleum county has no attorney residing within its borders, and there are other
counties which have a small enough attorney population to seriously question whether
one attorney in each county would be willing and able to serve as a justice of the
peace. Interviews with justices and questionnaires from county attorneys, June-August,
1972.
OAs expressed by a justice in one of the largest counties, all lawyers stick together,
even if one of them becomes a judge, and with lawyers in charge of all the courts in
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in the larger counties with a population over a certain figure.53 This
figure could be set so as to include only those counties that need one
or more full-time justices, and would thus counter many of the practical
arguments that would certainly be raised. As an alternative to using
only population in this determination, the legislature could consider
other county characteristics as well, and specify by name those counties
where justices must be lawyers.
For those justices not subject to any legal education requirement
that might be imposed, it would not be unreasonable to require some
other level of educational achievement. For example, a high school
diploma or its equivalent might be required.54 Any such qualification
would admittedly be minimal in this day and age, but at least it could
then be assumed that all justices had the ability to read and write
at a satisfactory level.
TRAINING
This topic is really a qualification, since if any training is made
mandatory, then taking part in such sessions would be a requirement
for not only attaining, but retaining office. It is worth considering
separately, however, because not only did the drafters of the new con-
stitution set it apart,55 but if it is assumed that at least some laymen
will remain as justices, it becomes obvious that some form of systematic
training in the law must be offered to and required of them.
Criticism of the collective competency of justices of the peace in
this state is not surprising nor unwarranted when training that is avail-
able to these judges is considered. No effort has ever been made on a
regular basis or on a large enough scale to provide these justices with
a comprehensive orientation course, and very little has been offered
in the way of continuing legal education to keep them informed on
changes in the law or new procedures to be followed. 56 What is sur-
prising is that so much of the scorn that has been directed at the cap-
abilities of these judges has come from members of the legal community.
It is these very people who could have developed programs over the
years to increase the legal knowledge of justices, and yet their efforts
for the most part have stopped at the contribution of criticism, often
unconstructive.
As a first step in raising the collective competency of justices,
it seems necessary that attendance at an orientation school be made
1E.g., see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 3.12.071 (1961), where a justice is required to be
an attorney in cities with populations of 5,000 or more.
6See, COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37.14.3(4) (1963).
6'MONT. CONST. art. VI1, § 5 (1972).
5Distriet Judge E. Gardner Brownlee has conducted three-day training seminars in re-
cent years for lower court judges, under the auspices of either the Governor's Crime
Control Commission or the Montana Law Enforcement Academy.
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mandatory for laymen justices before they can take office. 57 Such
a school should be at least one or two weeks in duration to be of value.
It should not attempt to turn out junior lawyers, but rather to simply
inform the justices of what their jobs are as judges and how to go
about them in a correct and efficient manner. This comment is no place
to lay out such a course in detail,58 but some related remarks would be
pertinent.
Any such school must be preceded by the development of admin-
istrative supervision over the justice court system. 9 There must be
someone or some group with proper qualifications that is not only respon-
sible for conducting the school, but also for determining beforehand the
general direction that the training should take. Additionally, there must
be some means established of knowing whether the justices practice
what they learn once they return home.
The decision must be made whether to incorporate a grandfather
clause into the legislative language, and thereby exempt justices from
this initial training if they have served in the office in recent years.
Such a clause would of course recognize the value of experience and
make any training requirements more palatable to justices of the peace.
However, the value of having all incumbent and newly-elected justices
attend one of the schools and learn to handle their tasks uniformly is
undeniable. Tenure as a justice does not insure that correct procedures
are followed consistently, and justices themselves are the first to admit
this.60
It must also be considered whether an examination is to be given
at the conclusion of the orientation course. 61 The purpose of such a
course, as discussed above, should be to give the justice a basic under-
standing of his role and functions as a judicial officer. The course
should thus provide a foundation on which to build with subsequent
training. If a justice has neither the will nor the ability to absorb these
basic concepts, this should be made known as early as possible and an
examination would provide this information. Those Montana justices
0This requirement is made in New York (N.Y. UNIFORM JUSTICE COURT ACT k 105
(McKinney 1963)); Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 1803.2 (1956)); and Iowa (-IOwA
CODE ANN. § 601.134 (1950)). In Montana, the school could be held after the election
in November and before the first week of January. The issuance of a justice's certifi-
cate of election could be contingent upon his presentation of a certificate of comple-
tion from the school to the county clerk. Those justices appointed to fill an unexpired
term could be allowed to serve, contingent upon their attendance at the next available
school.
IFor a discussion of the content and mechanics of such a course, see Ronayne, Law
School Training for Non-Lawyer Judges, 17 J. LEGAL ED. 197 (1964); Jacowitz,
Education and Training of Justices of the Peace Prior to Assuming Office--A Pro-
posal, 34 [sic] NEW YORK STATE 3AR JOURNAL 61 (1963).
"Infra at 140-2.
6The majority of those justices interviewed, June-August, 1972, would not object to
having to attend such an orientation course. Those that did object did so on practical
grounds, e.g. they could not take a week or more off from their business. Only one
justice claimed that he would not benefit from such schooling.
aRonayne, supra note 58 at 207.
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commenting on such a course expressed fear of such an examination,
however. At least one questioned the ability of the state to deny a
person, on the basis of a failed examination, an office to which he had
been elected.62 While discussing examinations, it should be noted that
one jurisdicition makes it necessary for laymen lower court judges to
pass an examination, but that there is no orientation course or other
formalized training available before the examination.13 The candidate
is notified of some of the cases and statutes to be aware of,6 4 and then
left to his own devices in acquiring the needed information. Such an
arrangement would be impractical in Montana, since many rural candi
dates would not have easy access to the necessary books. It would also
seem to be unwise since one goal of justice court reform in this state
must be to promote similarity of operation in the system, and orienta-
tion schools would be one means of accomplishing this.
Complementing any orientation courses should be annual seminars
which would bring the justices up to date on changes in the law, provide
an opportunity to study certain areas of the law in greater detail, and
allow justices to get some help with particular problems that are
bothering them. Again, details for such sessions should be left for a
later time,65 but an initial question to be answered is whether attendance
at one of these sessions each year should be made mandatory. A require-
ment of this sort seems entirely realistic and indeed necessary to main-
tain any degree of competency in the system. Opposition to mandatory
attendance would be minimal if it were possible to conduct these ses-
sions regionally, at different times of the year, and for no more than
three or four days at a time. Justices themselves recognize the ad,
vantages of such regular training, and of those interviewed for this
study, fifty-seven said the yearly sessions should be mandatory and only
five argued that they should be voluntary. Many of these justices have
been to one or more of the voluntary training sessions that have been
held in the state, and know that the number in attendance has been
insufficient.68
As a supplement to any training that is provided to justices, it is
imperative that a bench book be prepared for use in justice of the
peace courts.67 A consistent complaint of justices in this state is that
aInterviews with justices, June-August, 1972. Worry over the examinations would
recede as they are found to be fair and the failings are few. The constitutional ques-
tion has been evaded in New York by awarding a certificate of completion to every
justice who completes the school, and then requesting those who "fail" the exam to
attend the school again. Supra, note 61.
aCAL. Gov'T. CODE § 71601 (West 1964).
"Announcement of Qualifying Examination for Office of Judge of the Justice Court,
enclosed with a letter from Mr. Warren Marsden, Project Director, Administrator
of the Courts, San Francisco, California, dated August 24, 1972.
aThese seminars could be similar to those sponsored by the Montana Law Enforcement
Academy in Bozeman, Montana, on two occasions during the summer months of 1972.
"Supra, note 65. Of the 170 justices in the state, fourteen attended the first session
and thirteen attended the second.
67For examples of such books, see ARKANSAs LocAL COURT JUDGE'S MANUAL, and the
WASHINGTON STATiE MANUAL FOR JUSTICE COURTS.
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they do not have any type of a manual which intelligently sets out the
statutes they must deal with or the procedures which must be followed.68
A book is needed that can be used by these justices as a guide in their
daily judicial activities. It should be written and arranged in an easy
to understand fashion, should be loose-leaf so as to allow for regular
revision, and should be used as a basic teaching tool in both the orienta-
tion school and the yearly seminars.
COMPENSATION
The topic of compensation is of course directly related to the issues
of numbers of justices and qualifications. Reducing the number of
justices gives those who remain a chance to be better compensated, no
matter what form that compensation takes. Any additional qualifications
that are imposed must be matched by a correlative increase in com-
pensation to attract and retain qualified persons.
Montana's present compensatory schedule for justices is inadequate,
even assuming no significant changes are made in the system. By
statute, justices in townships of more than 10,000 persons must sit full,
time and are to receive a salary dependent upon the population of the
township in which they sit.69 Justices in townships with a population
of less than 10,000 persons are to retain their fees collected as compen-
sation.70 Schedules are established which set out the fees to be charged
in both civil and criminal actions,71 and a ceiling of $750 per annum is
put on fee intake from criminal cases.72
The salaries provided for full-time justices are obviously inadequate,
even for laymen, but it is the fee basis of compensation which has
condemned this entire compensation plan to extinction. Commentators
have universally attacked the fee basis, often on substantial constitution-
al grounds, 73 and no additional criticism seems necessary. The fee
system has operated in Montana as contemptably as in other juris-
dictions.74
The mandate in the new Montana constitution to provide all justices
with a "monthly compensation" 75 should bury the fee system once and
OInterviews with justices, June-August, 1972. Justices do find a manual cited supra,
note 50, to be very helpful, but a bench book with more practical information is still
necessary.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 25-306. The schedule ranges from a salary of $4,200 per annum for
a justice in a township of from 10,000-15,000 persons, to $5,500 in a township having
a population of more than 18,000 persons. Because of the township population limita-
tion, only twenty-two of the justices in this state are presently salaried. Both salaried
and non-salaried justices can retain miscellaneous fees collected under R.C.M. 1947,
§ 25-304.
-
0R.C.M. 1947, § 25-304.
nR.C.M. 1947, §§ 25-301, 25-303.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 25-303.73See, among other writings, Note, The Justice of the Peace: Constitutional Questions,
69 W. VA. L. REv. 314 (1967); Reynolds, The Fee System Courts-Denial of Due
Process, 170 OKLA. L. REv. 373 (1964).
"MUCKELSTON, supra note 4 at 76-8.
13MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 5 (1972).
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for all. The initial question in implementing this salary requirement,
however, involves the identity of the body which will ultimately set the
individual salaries. In some jurisdictions, the state has delegated this
power to the counties, and allowed the county commissioners to deter-
mine the justice salaries in each county.76 Such a procedure does take
into consideration the reality of barebone county budgets, the individ-
uality of counties, and the argument that a state should not set specific
salary schedules that the counties must meet unless the state is willing
and able to absorb at least a portion of that salary. 77 The problem
with this approach is the disparity in the quality of justice that will
result, depending upon the amount of money a county would allocate
for these salaries. Uniformity in the system would be difficult to main-
tain, and upgrading of the courts to any degree would not be assured.
The justices themselves in Montana recognize the faults of allowing
the counties too much discretion in setting salaries.78 Such an attitude
is due in large part to the poor treatment that many justices have
received by their county commissioners, and causes the fear that little
would change if responsibility for reform would ultimately rest at the
local level.79
At least one state has placed salary determinations for lower court
judges in the hands of the state supreme court.80 Such a procedure
would of course promote continuous administrative supervision, but con-
sidering the present lack of a staff to deal with such matters, the Mon-
tana supreme court is ill-prepared to function in such a capacity.8 '
Assuming then that the legislature should establish the salary
schedule, another preliminary question of great magnitude concerns the
source of these funds. Salaries now paid to Montana justices are paid
out of county treasuries,8 2 and it is probable that these same treasuries
will again be tapped under any salary schedule that is adopted. How-
ever, there is a recognized national trend towards either partial or total
state absorption of lower court costs, especially of salaries.83 The ad-
ministration of justice is coming to be recognized as a legitimate expense
"See, N v. REV. STAT. § 4.040 (1967), under which boards of county commissioners
have complete authority to fix compensation of justices either by salary, retention of
fees, or both.
1ACIR, STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTIQE SYSTEM, supra note 10 at
206-11.
780f the justices interviewed, June-August, 1972, only three who expressed an opinion on
this subject said that the boards of county commissioners should set their salaries.
Of the remainder, several felt either the commissioners or the legislature could so act,
but the vast majority felt the job should belong only to the legislature.
Interviews with justices, June-August, 1972. Complaints by justices about boards of
county commissioners are as numerous as they are varied. Many complained of re-
quests for facilities that have been denied, others of office refurnishing jobs that
keep being put off, and one alleged that the county commissioners were going to split
the town into additional townships to avoid having to pay a justice a salary.
8ALASKA STAT. § 22.15 (1962).
sInfra at 140-2.
R.C.M. 1947, § 25-306.
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that should be incurred by the state, and uniform funding for the justice
courts is the only guarantee of statewide consistency of operation. Such
a salary sharing arrangement has precedent in Montana,8 4 and the
legislature could follow a similar procedure.
These preliminary issues aside, there would appear to be numerous
legislative alternatives in establishing the required monthly salary sched-
ule.8 - An attempt could be made to correlate the schedule to a justice's
caseload, but until there is continuous supervision of the justice courts
and compilation of related data, this seems impossible. Furthermore,
such an arrangement would only resurrect the economic competition
problems that are inherent in the fee system of compensation.
A second alternative is to set an arbitrary salary figure that would
be paid to any full-time justice in the state s.8  Those justices serving on
less than a full-time basis could receive a percentage of that figure,
depending upon the amount of time they are to serve each month. A
schedule based on such a figure would promote uniformity in the system
and should attract qualified persons, assuming the figure set is adequate.
It could not, however, consider the peculiar circumstances of each county,
budgetary and otherwise.
One of the more practical alternatives would be to accept the fact
that the office of justice of the peace is being transformed from a town-
ship position, compensated by fee, into one that is salaried and recognizes
a county as its boundaries. As such, justices could simply be added to
the list of other county officers whose salaries are determined both by
the population of a county and its taxable valuation.8 7 Full-time justices
could receive a salary in accordance with the schedule, and those serving
part-time could receive a percentage of the schedule amount in relation
to the number of hours worked each month. This would accord counties
their individual identities, and would automatically provide a justice
with a larger salary as the population of the county grew and his case-
load correspondingly increased.
FACILITIES
Yet another of the major criticisms leveled at justice courts is the
lack of adequate quarters in which justices can handle their caseloads.
The argument is made, and justifiably so, that the place where a judge
holds court bears a direct relationship to the amount of respect that
"Under R.C.M. 1947, § 25-601, the salaries of county attorneys are payable monthly,
one-half from the county treasury and one-half from the state treasury upon the war-
rant of the state auditor.
"The assumption is made that at least for the near future, the majority of justices will
continue to be laymen.
"E.g., under 10 DEL. CODE ANN. § 9209 (1953), a justice earns $10,000 a year.
'R.C.M. 1947, § 25-605. Considering the responsibilities held by a justice as a judicial
officer, it would seem necessary that they be treated as are county superintendents of
schools and county sheriffs under the statute, and thus receive the additional $400 in
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both he as a judge and that court level are accorded. s8 Thus, any up-
grading of this court system must involve a reassessment of justice court
facilities.
The unlikely places that justices in Montana have held "court" have
been documented and do not bear repeating.8 9 This situation can come
as no surprise, however, in light of controlling legislation. Neither the
state nor the county are required to provide any facilities for justices, 90
and one statute makes it very clear that "[a] justice's court may be held
at any place selected by the justice . ... "91 Thus, with no statutory re-
quirement of either funding for facilities or holding court in a particular
place, it is difficult to find fault solely with the justices themselves.
This lack of fiscal and administrative direction has led to a situation
where only a minority of justices of the peace in this state hold court
in a location which has any semblance of a courtroom. Of those justices
personally interviewed on field visits, it was found that twenty-one of
them handled the majority of their caseloads in an office in the court-
house, nine at their place of business, twenty-one in their homes, three
in sheriff's offices, and one in a jail.92 In defense of this general situation,
it is true that a person is usually more concerned with the outcome of a
court proceeding than the physical surroundings, 93 and that too much
formality can result in the intimidation of persons appearing in court.94
Such statements only remain true, however, when time is of the essence
in a case and appearance must give way to substance, and also when
there already exists enough formality in a court to remind a person
that he is involved in a judicial proceeding. Neither of these conditions
prevails in Montana justice courts at this time.
The drafters of the new constitution were aware of this problem,
and wrote that "[t]here shall be provided such facilities that they
may perform their duties in dignified surroundings. '95 This later phrase
is nothing but empty words of art and can only take substance from
what legislation make of them. Any treatment of this phrase will, of
course, depend upon the degree of justice court consolidation that can
be achieved, but several alternatives seem available.
MACIR, STATE-LocAL RELATIONS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 10 at
183.
MMason and Crowley, supra note 3 at 5.
T Under both R.C.M. 1947, § 16-3606 and § 25-306, the board of county commissioners
may provide suitable quarters for justices of the peace at county expense.
-'R.C.M. 1947, § 93-402.
'Interviews with justices, June-August, 1972. This figure of only one-third of thejustices having a "courtroom" compares favorably to that percentage found in a
study conducted in 1966. See, Mason and Crowley, supra note 3 at 5.
MBROWNLEE, supra note 50 at 101. This is certainly true in criminal proceedings, e.g.
when an arrested person is brought before a justice to have bail set.
"McConnell, Somhe Trials of the Magistrate, 54 A.B.A.J. 37, 38 (1968). As written,
S. . . and if it is true that a defendant is more comfortable and therefore more
inclined to appear and defend himself when he feels wronged given a less formal
atmosphere, perhaps we should hesitate in making the magistrate courts more formal,
even if the defendant then perversely complains of the lack of formality."
"MONT. OONST. art. VII, § 5 (1972).
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Legislation could speak in specific terms as to what must be provided
by the counties in the way of an office, such as its size, seating capacity,
and specific location. This language would have the advantage of pro-
moting uniformity in the system and the assurance that the need for
judicial decorum would be recognized in every county, no matter how
rural the setting. Any such specific requirements might, however, prove
impossible to follow in counties with genuine facility problems already,
and would necessitate continuous revision as needs of the courts changed.
A second alternative would be to simply require the counties by
statute to provide their justices of the peace with "dignified surround-
ings," and then rely on the sound discretion of the boards of county
commissioners in assessing the needs of their local justice court and
satisfying them. Such a provision is really no change from the effect
of present statutes, and it is questionable if the counties would satis-
factorily discharge their responsibilities in light of their poor record
in the past.9 8
A third alternative would be based on the assumptions that it is
desirable to have as much of a justice's caseload as possible handled
in a respectable office, and that this office if at all possible should be
located in the county courthouse so as to benefit from that building's
atmosphere. Counties with populations of over 5,000 persons could be
required to provide justices who are sitting in the county seat with an
office in the courthouse and access to the district courtroom. This office
should be "respectable," or have to meet some other standard, but should
not have to conform to impractical size and location requirements. The
setting aside of an office for justices in the larger counties does not
appear unreasonable in light of the priority that should be accorded
justices as judicial officers, and the fact that justices in such counties
should be serving on at least a half-day basis. Undoubtedly, some
counties would claim unavailability of room in the courthouse for justice
quarters, but faith should be placed in their resourcefulness.9 7
In counties with populations of less than 5,000 persons, a justice is
probably not needed any more than a few hours a week, and it would
seem unrealistic to tie up an office in the courthouse for his exclusive
use, even if one were available. Therefore, the justice could be required
to hold court in the district courtroom, and if necessary, to share an
office with another county officer. If it were found necessary that
some justices should serve outside-the county seat, the county could be
required to make arrangements so that an office, or at least access to
an office, is available in a public building such as a city hall.
"Supra note 79.
07Some justices themselves claim a lack of room in the courthouse for an office. Inter-
views with justices, June-August, 1972. This situation can be deceiving, however. In
one county, a justice conducts a private business out of a rented office in the court-
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Legislation of this nature must go the next step and require justices
to hold court in the facilities that are to be provided. It is not unreal-
istic to expect some of the "kitchen-table" justices to continue to hold
court as they have in the past, even though an office is made available.
Also, legislation should not only focus on the rooms to be utilized as
quarters, but must consider furniture and fixture needs as well. This
observation should not even have to be made, but it becomes necessary
when justice offices are either so sparsely furnished so as to resemble
interrogation rooms or so poorly furnished as to resemble secondhand
stores.
At the same time facilities are discussed, thought must be given to
providing some clerical help to justices. Justice of the peace budgets in
the largest counties in the state usually include some funds for such
aid. However, some of the justices who serve part-time in other counties
have increasingly large caseloads and are finding it difficult to have
time both to hold court and do all the necessary bookkeeping and docket
workf 8 One solution would be to require a county to provide a justice
with clerical help for so many hours a week, depending on county popu-
lation. Another alternative would be to utilize the clerk of the district
court as a clerk for justice courts as well. This office could at least
handle the justice court's docket books, and thus increase the chance
that the requisite entries are correctly made.9 9 Support for such an
arrangement by district court clerks is questionable, however, and some
justices would even oppose the plan since it would put their operations
under the direct observation of the district court.100
SUPERVISION
Completing the set of often repeated complaints against justice of
the peace court systems generally is the charge that they too infrequently
come under the critical gaze of any supervisory authority. These courts
are usually not part of a unified judicial system, and with each court
operating in its own vacuum, there are few means available of knowing
whether an individual justice is doing what is expected of him and doing
it correctly. Thus, it appears that if an upgrading of the system is to be
lasting in effect, there must not only be some means of successfully
implementing these reforms, but also of insuring that their intent is car-
ried out at the local level. 10 '
"Interviews with justices, June-August, 1972.
9See, State of Montana ex rel. Wicks v. District Court of the Tenth Judicial District,
...... Mont .., 498 P.2d 1202 (1972). Here, since the docket of a justice of the peace
insufficiently reflected the requisite probable cause for the issuance of an arrest war-
rant, the warrant was held invalid and the subsequent search and seizure was found
unlawful.
10Interviews with justices, June-August, 1972.
Im'See, Giese, Why Illinois Proposes to Abolish Justice of the Peace Courts, 50 ILL. B. J.
677, 679 (1962). '" . . . these attempts to revise the justice of the peace system have
been woefully inadequate, since justices of the peace and police magistrates still re-
main as an independent appendage to the judicial system, with no official or body
authorized to put the legislative rules into effect or to assume responsibility for the
activities of the justices and the coordination of the system."
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The old constitution gave "general supervisory control over all
inferior courts" to the supreme court, 10 2 but this control has rarely
been exercised in a true administrative fashion. 0 3 At the present time
the Montana supreme court exercises no supervision of the justice courts,
and its clerk receives no data or other information on their operation.104
Current statutes provide for no better control apart from relatively
worthless fiscal checks by way of itemized statements and reports. 0 5
Supervision by the district courts is limited to those cases that are
appealed from justice courts. 0
The new constitution does not speak directly to this problem of
supervision, and only restates the old constitution's ambiguous mandate
that the supreme court shall have "general supervisory control over all
other courts."'01 7 Legislation will therefore be required to give meaning
to these words and to provide this all-important key to successful over-
haul of the system. The most pressing need is for some authority to start
showing a continuous concern for the operations of these courts, and
since the supreme court already has this responsibility in general, it
seems logical that it should discharge this responsibility in particular. 0 8
Legislation could expressly fix administrative supervision over the
justice courts in the supreme court, and this body could then exercise
this supervision by way of enforced rules of practice and procedure. 10 9
To aid the supreme court in carrying out this responsibility, the
legislature could create and fund the position of a court administrator.
Persons holding such a position in other jurisdictions bring a knowledge
and experience in administration to the task of aiding in the supervision
of court systems, and are usually concerned primarily with the higher
court levels in a state." 0 A court administrator in this state could
concern himself with the supreme and district courts as well, but the
weakest link in the Montana judicial system is the lower courts, and
it is here that attention should be focused and an administrator's talents
put to work.
A court administrator does not control a court system, but only
provides a supreme court with the necessary expertise so that it can act
intelligently in its supervisory capacity. Once the court so acts, it
remains to the administrator to see that the decisions made are imple-
U2MONT. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (1889).
1
'3MUCKELSTON, supra note 4 at 93.
'Interview with Mr. Tom Kearney, Clerk of the Montana Supreme Court, September
15, 1972.
-R.C.M. 1947, §§ 25-307, 31-114, 31-116, 94-801-1.
'R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-7901, 95-2009.
m'MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1972).
*Unless the judiciary itself assumes the responsibility of central administrative control
over these courts, the legislature will have to take that responsibility and the treasured
independence of the judiciary will be threatened. See, Pringle, Court Organization
and Administration, 1 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 569, 576-7 (1966).
"See discussion of the rule-making function, infra at 142-5.
'°For a discussion of the position, see Comment, Court Administration: The Newest
Profession, 10 DUQUESNE L. REV. 220 (1971).
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mented and then observed. Within such a context, an administrator in
this state could direct his and the supreme court's attention to such
matters as the standardization of bookkeeping procedures in justice
courts, the enforcement of reporting requirements, the drafting of new
procedural rules and their observation, the collection of data relevant
to these courts, and the concentration of effort to generally improve the
quality of justice that results at that level of our court system.
Not only could an administrator in Montana supervise the justices,
but he could advise them as well. Justices of the peace presently have
no proper person to turn to for information and advice on matters that
come before them. As a result, they either suffer in ignorance or develop
an unhealthy dependence upon the counsel of their county attorney.
Other justices look no further for advice than their local law enforcement
officers."' A court administrator could serve as an objective and readily
available source of needed information, and could in this way carry
on a continuing training program.
Supposing a need for such a position is not recognized or funds are
not available, the goal of continuous administrative supervision must
still be attained. Assuming the supreme court should still have that
responsibility, it would then become necessary for an active judicial
council to be formed to provide the court with the needed information.1 1 2
Such an organization might be called for by legislation or by rule of
the supreme court, should represent both those in and out of the legal
community, and could continually survey the justice court system in
the state and make their findings and recommendations known to the
supreme court. This body as a means of administrative supervision is,
of course, inferior to a court administrator who could bring both his
expertise in the area and his undivided attention to the task at hand.
The national trend is in fact to replace judicial councils with full-time
administrators .1
PRACTICE, PROCEDURE AND JURISDICTION
Once a framework of effective administrative supervision is devel-
oped for the justice courts in Montana, thought must then be given to
the creation of rules under which these courts will operate. As dis-
cussed above, each justice tends to work in a vacuum." 4 This situation
results not only from an absence of supervision, but also from alack
of legislative or judicial standards that a justice can apply to his own
lumterviews with justices, June-August, 1972.
'See, Finley, Judicial Administration: What is This Thing Called Legal Reform?
COLUM. L. REv. 569, 589-91 (1965). Organizations such as the Montana Citizens Con-
ference for Court Improvement have been active in this state, but the scope of their
operations falls short of providing continuous supervision of justice courts.
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judicial activities. He is faced with few rules that must be observed
as to the internal administration of his court, and also finds little
guidance in statutes that focus on the procedural steps in litigation.
His confusion over court operations in general does great harm to his
competency as a judge, and can only be cleared up by the imposition
of enforced rules.
The power to make such rules was not delegated under the old
constitution. It consequently developed that the supreme court so acted
with the permission of the legislature,115 although little attention has
been given to justice courts. Neither does the new constitution delegate
administrative or procedural rule-making authority to the supreme court
or the legislature. It thus remains possible for either the legislature
or the supreme court, under a grant of authority from the legislature,
to act in this area.
PRACTICE
Justices themselves in this state are quick to complain about the
lack of standards that govern them in their day-to-day activities."16
There are statutes that deal with such topics as office hours,117 and which
entries must be made in the dockets, 11s but each justice of the peace is,
for the most part, left to administer his own court at his own discretion.
This situation not only frustrates any goal of having the justice courts
operate as a uniform court system, but also puts an unnecessary burden
on justices to retain their independence as judges. Since administrative
rules do not exist, persons such as law enforcement officers often
attempt to have a justice court operated for their own purposes and
convenience. 1 9
The solution called for is the drafting and implementation of a
set of administrative rules for all justice courts by either the legislature,
or, preferably, by the supreme court at the direction of the legislature.
These rules should spell out in understandable terms what is expected
of justices in the internal operations of their courts (e.g., what hours a
justice court should be open in a county with a certain population), and
make a specific attempt to clear up the many bookkeeping, docketing,
urFor a discussion of the rule-making power both generally and in Montana, see MUCKEL-
STON, supra note 4 at 103-9.
".?Interviews with justices, June-August, 1972.
-_R.C.M. 1947, § 25-306. The 1889 Montana Constitution (art. VIII, § 22) only con-
fused the -issue by requiring that "Justices ' courts shall always be 'open for. the
transaction of business, except on legal holidays and nonjudicial days."
-R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-7601, 95-2002.
'"Interviews with justices, June-August, 1972. Of course, it is admitted that due to a
justice's role as a judicial officer, e.g., his part in the criminal commitment process,
he must be flexible in terms of when, where and how he holds court. However, when
law enforcement personnel start telling a justice how to handle a case since there are
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and reporting problems that plague the system. Without such directives
and their enforcement, little reform of justice court operations can be
achieved.
PROCEDURE
The system not only needs rules for the administration of courts,
but also procedural rules to govern the handling of litigation. Present
statutes concerning criminal procedure in justice courts are found in
the Montana Code of Criminal Procedure, and require no immediate,
sweeping changes.' 20 Justice courts are also subject to numerous statutes
concerning civil procedure.' 2' Several of these individual statutes will
have to be reconsidered in light of anticipated reform of these courts,
but the most glaring fault to be found with them is not their content
so much as their presentation. They follow no consistent pattern, and
reflect little of the clarity and common sense that is found in the Mon-
tana Rules of Civil Procedure which govern the district courts. 122 It
would be desirable if the rules for justice courts could be adapted to a
similar format.
When considering the adoption or change of any procedural rules,
it will also be necessary to discuss the need for and the structuring of
small claims courts in this state. This court is commonly viewed as a
judicial forum where a person can get his day in court without having
to endure the expensive and frustrating trappings of a traditional court.
It is, ideally, a place where a person can take a small monetary claim
that an attorney cannot afford to handle, and have that claim settled
by a judge as inexpensively and expeditiously as possible. Procedures
to handle such claims differ of course in those states that offer this
alternative, but their chief characteristics remain fairly universal' 23
It is difficult to document the need for such courts in Montana, but
their creation would not be hard to justify in light of the present
expense of litigating a small claim and the few such claims that are
eventually litigated. In a detailed study of the caseloads of justices of
the peace in this state, it was learned that ". . . the-great bulk of such
civil actions [in justice courts] are actions for recovery of debt, gen-
erally through the medium of garnishment or attachment .... '124 and
it was therefore concluded that ". . . small civil claims are largely
ignored under our present system.' 12 5
-R.C.M. 1947, § 95-2001 et seq. The section which sets out docket entry requirements
.(R.C.M. 1947, § 2002) perhaps needs revision and expansion in light of the case cited
supra note 99. R.C.M. 1947, § 95-2006 (a) also requires revision since a unanimous
verdict of the jury will be necessary in justice courts. See MONT. CONST. art. IT, § 26(1972).
-R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-6601, 93-7714, 93-7901 et seq.
'Mont. R. Civ. P., Rule 1.
mMason and Crowley, supra note 3 at 24.
2id. at 22.
'1Id. at 23. The same conclusion was reached by this author from interviews with jus-
tices, June-August, 1972. Many of the part-time justices in the smaller counties had
[Vol. 34
23
Holden: Justice Court Reform In Montana
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1973
JUSTICE COURT REFORM IN MONTANA
Assuming that a need does exist in Montana for a small claims
court, the question arises as to how the court should be structured.
Details of these courts in other jurisdictions vary greatly, and it is im-
possible to generalize from this multi-state information as to whether
a new or existing court level should assume this function. It is significant
to note, however, that in at least seven of the states that have retained
a justice of the peace court system, this system has been utilized to
handle small claims. 126  Whether this arrangement would be possible
in Montana depends certainly upon the success of the reforms of the
justice system that are eventually implemented. 27 If the competency of
justices is raised to a point where at least some of them could fairly
and intelligently conduct a small claims court, then it would be sensible
to use this existing system. Rules for such a court have already been
drafted,'1 28 and could provide a place at which to begin discussion. An-
other alternative would be to create a separate court level to handle
small claims,1 29 but it is hard to view proliferation of courts in Montana
at this time as an acceptable direction of change. This step should
only be taken if and when it is concluded that the present judicial
system is incapable of meeting this need, even with substantial im-
provement.
JURISDICTION
Any consideration of procedure requires at least a brief discussion
of the present and future jurisdiction of justice of the peace courts.
It is also difficult to direct any course of change in the system without
knowing what proportion of judicial business this particular court level
will handle. Under the old constitution, justices sat in courts of limited
jurisdiction,'1 30 and references were made to the exact kinds of cases
that could not be handled in these courts.' 3' Justices were also directed
a hard time remembering the last civil case they had handled which involved only
private citizens. Even in one of the largest counties where the justices serve full-time
and where the court would seem to be more receptive to small claim-type actions, the
clerk of that court estimated that more than ninety-five per cent of the civil cases
filed in a year are collection actions.
2'Nevada, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont and Washington.
1MIt is well-recognized that even the consideration of a small, elementary monetary claim
calls for the services of a qualified judge. See, R. POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS,
279 (1940). Initially, it would not be necessary that all justices in the state handle
small claims, and perhaps only those demonstrating the requisite ability could so act.
It is to be hoped that eventually at least one justice in each county could handle these
claims.
'Mason and Crowley, supra note 3 at 24-5.
"'The legislature could create this new court system. See MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 1
(1972).12 MONT. CONST. art. VIII, § 20 (1889).
mMONT. CONST. art. VIII, § 21 (1889). Listings of what is within the jurisdiction of
justice courts are found in R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-408, 93-410.
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not to handle ". . any case where the debt, damage, claim or value of
the property involved exceeds the sum of three hundred dollars."'
1 3 2
These courts retain their limited jurisdiction label under the new
constitution, and, except for mention that they can only serve as exam-
ining courts in a felony, no mention is made of those cases which
the court cannot handle."3  This deletion, for the first time, places
numerous types of actions in a position where they could fall within
the jurisdiction of justice courts, dependent upon forthcoming legis-
lation. These changes should not be immediate, however, and should
only be made as the degree of success of any reform efforts is ascer-
tained.
The failure of the new constitution to cite any civil jurisdictional
amount limit for justice courts is also significant. Although the $300
figure still remains by statute, 134 it now is possible for the legislature
to adjust this figure as it deems necessary. This action should be part
of any reform package, and should take into account such factors as
the inflationary pressures on law suits, similar figures in other juris-
dictions, and the fact that there is now overlapping jurisdiction between
justice and district courts."85
There are jurisdictional problems which the new constitution does
not touch upon, including the various powers and duties which have
been brought within a justice's jurisdiction over the years. Statutes
presently give a justice of the peace a "jack-of-all-trades" function,
which includes acting as a coroner ol occasion, 13 serving as a deputy
registrar of electors,"17 and investigating fires."8  These statutes are
infrequently invoked and admittedly cause no serious harm, but it would
be desirable that other county officers assume these duties if necessary,
and thereby free the justice from as many non-judicial functions as
possible.
DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL
Even with substantial reform of the system in those areas dis-
cussed to this point, the possibility of an occasional unacceptable justice
being elected to and retaining office must be recognized. Such improve-
ments as fewer justices, acceptable salaries, stricter qualifications, ade-
quate training, continuous supervision, and the imposition of enforced
.. MONT. CoNST. art VIII, § 20 (1889). For a more complete treatment of the jurisdic-
tion of justice courts, see Mason and Kimball, Montana's Justices' Courts-- -According
to the Law, 23 MONT. L. REv. 62, 67-81 (1961).
MMONT. CONST. art. VII, § 5 (1972).
Z-R.C.M. 1947, § 93-408.
1'1Under B.C.M. 1947, § 93-318, district courts have jurisdiction when the amount in
controversy exceeds fifty dollars. Justice courts have concurrent jurisdiction with
district courts on forcible entry and unlawful detainer actions under R:C.M. 1947, §
93-9705.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 16-3405.
R.C.M. 1947, § 23-505.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 82-120-9.
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administrative and procedural rules will do much to insure that a
more qualified candidate will be elected and will serve, but incompetence
and unethical behavior are often slow to surface in any position. 189
When this happens, there nmst be effective means available to either
discipline the guilty parties, or in some cases, remove them from the
system.
To the present time, means have not been available to discipline
justices of the peace in Montana. An exasperated county attorney or
district judge might on occasion privately rebuke a wayward justice
for an extraordinarily large blunder, but no further steps are taken
to see that the error is not repeated. As for removal from office, a
justice cannot be impeached as can other state and judicial officers. 40
He is, however, subject to removal for misconduct or malfeasance as
are all other state officers not liable for impeachment. 1 41 There is also
available another procedure called "summary proceedings" under which
even a private citizen can initiate action against any public officer.1 42
If utilized when necessary, either of these procedures could be
effective in cleansing the justice court system of many of the judges
who are responsible for the system's low public esteem. However, due
to the character of the procedures, i.e., criminal and quasi-criminal in
nature, it is not surprising that county attorneys and other persons are
hesitant in bringing such actions. The proceedings are so public and
potentially damaging that an airtight case would have to be brought
against a justice, who is not entirely to blame for his failings. 43
The new constitution offers another solution by requiring the
creation of a judicial standards commission. 44 Its creation will follow
the prevailing trend in the handling of unsatisfactory judges, 45 and
should be an acceptable solution to this sensitive problem. The commis-
sion's success, however, in improving the collective competency of jus-
tices of the peace will only come if this body keeps its raison d'etre
firmly in mind and does not serve a whitewashing function. The supreme
'This danger is even increased under the new constitutional provision which raises the
term of office for a justice of the peace to four years, up from the two year tenure
that has been in effect. See MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 7 (1972).14 R.C.M. 1947, § 94-5401.1 R.C.M. 1947, § 94-5501. This procedure is commenced by an accusation brought by a
grand jury, county attorney, or the attorney general, and the trial required is con-
ducted in the same manner as for a misdemeanor. See R.C.M. 1947, § 94-5502 et seq.
-JR.C.M 1947, § 94-5516. This proceeding is treated like a civil case, and yet is quasi-
criminal in nature.
'"It would appear difficult to indict a person for his ignorance when those in positions
of power have done little to change that condition. This feeling is attested to by the
fact that apparently few such proceedings have ever been brought against a justice
of the peace in Montana.
'"MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 11 (1972). The commission is to investigate complaints
made against any justice or judge in the state, and from its confidential proceedings
are to come recommendations to the supreme court. The court is then empowered to
take steps, including removal from office, against the offenders.
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court must also act in response to the commission's recommendations
in a fair and firm manner. Should this working relationship be achieved,
no changes in existing statutes or additional provisions for the discipline
or the removal of justices from office seem necessary.
MISCELLANEOUS CONSIDERATIONS
Any overhaul of the justice court system should touch on various
topics that have not thus far been discussed for one reason or another.
A few of these topics should at least be mentioned. One of these is the
desirability of adopting a code of ethics which would apply to justices
both in and outside of their judicial activities.146 Perhaps with increased
supervision of the system and the presence of the judicial standards com-
mission, such a code would be superfluous. However, it would still be
beneficial in providing justices with a means to remind them of their
ethical obligations as judicial officers. The supreme court could promul-
gate such a code, or the court could merely pass upon a draft submitted
by the Montana Magistrates Association.
Another subject to be mentioned is the present requirement of
having justices of the peace run for office on a partisan ballot.147 This
is one of the more frequent complaints of justices, 14 and caused the
adoption of a resolution at their most recent state meeting calling for
the nonpartisan election of candidates to this office.149 Those justices
interviewed who raised this objection were hard-pressed to cite any
specific instances where this requirement has in any way infringed
upon their judicial integrity,150 and there is the argument that the
nonpartisan election of judges has some inherent shortcomings.' 5' Never-
theless, treating justices similar to district and supreme court judges for
election purposes would give them much-needed identity as judicial
officers, and would be a relatively simple change to make in at least
partially restoring public confidence in these courts.
Finally, it would be desirable that when reform does come to this
system, that an attempt be made to collect these new provisions, the
changed statutes, and those that remain the same and bind them into
a cohesive justice court act.1 52 The Revised Codes of Montana, (1947),
now has statutes that relate to justices of the peace and their courts
scattered throughout its chapters, and the capstone of any reform should
be a unification and recodification of these statutes.
'"As an example, see VIRGINIA JUSTICES' OF THE PEACE MANUAL, ix (1967).
'
41R.C.M. 1947, § 23-2001 et seq. provides for the nonpartisan nomination and election of
only justices of the supreme court and judges of the district courts.
""Interviews with justices, June-August, 1972.
t"Annual convention of the Montana Magistrates Association, Helena, September 14-16,
1972. Such a change was also called for in H.B. 362 submitted to the 1972 session
of the Montana state legislature.
u'Interviews with justices, June-August, 1972.
"
1 ACIR, STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYsTEM, supra note 10 at
196-7.
',See, e.g., N.Y. UNiFORm JUSTICE COURT ACT, § 101 et seq. (McKinney 1963).
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CONCLUSION
It is hoped that the preceding remarks raise some of the more
immediate problems that must be faced when any attention is given tG
reform of the justice of the peace courts in Montana. In light of the
mandates of the new constitution, the legislature must sooner or later
come to grapple with these problems that have been too long ignored.
It is further hoped that this comment will at least present some food
for thought on alternatives to their solution.
Many of those alternatives considered are admittedly less reformistic
in nature than those debated and ultimately adopted in other states
that have recently gone through this very same process. However, as
discussed previously, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention
appreciably narrowed the path that lower court reform can take in this
state in the immediate future. Coupling this fact with concerns for
practicality and political acceptability, it simply becomes necessary to
take smaller steps. Even those steps that are taken are going to seem
unnecessary to many persons who have no quarrel with the system, and
it is this dichotomy of positions which must be compromised.
It is believed that reforms such as those suggested are both sub-
stantial enough to effect a beginning of the requisite upgrading of the
system and pragmatic enough to take into consideration the numerous
and varying oppositions to change. Such proposals as these or ones
similar, which revolve around the retention of the justice court system,
deserve a chance to prove themselves. If they should fail, abolition of
the system by way of a constitutional amendment must be seriously
considered and a true unified court system adopted.
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